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TWO CENTURIES OF TAX IMMUNITY*
ROBERT

W.

GRAHAM** AND GEORGE STINSON***

It is a common belief that "the first hundred years are the hardest".
To the protagonists of intergovernmental tax immunity this supposed
wisdom will appear to be only another "seductive clich6", 1 for, after
an initial century during which the doctrine was hailed as the cornerstone of our federal system, an important portion of the principle, in
the beginning of the second century, has been stigmatized as an "encrustation"' 2 and sloughed off like some impudent barnacle. Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe is, in its own terms, a double repudiation of
"... an implied constitutional immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a state government. ....3
The businesslike way in which Justice Stone makes this clear is surprising in contrast with the modesty he demonstrated in Helvering v.
Gerhardt.4 The result reached, however, was not unexpected, for the
Supreme Court did not accomplish this important step without long
beforehand placing the stones on which to base its present position.
The period during which the opinions and dissents of the Court
have spoken in a, critical undertone against the immunity of the officers
of one government from the taxing power of the other dates from Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell.5 The first undeniable assault on the doctrine
came with Helvering v. Gerhardt, and yet it was not clear from the
rationale of the Court how sweeping the decision really was. It was
made explicit that Collector v. Day6 was not overruled on its facts. 7 In
the light of the O'Keefe case, which has something to say in explanation
of it, we are better able to evaluate the earlier decision. The Court in
the Gerhardt case, it now appears, removed the presumption of "burden" which had traditionally supported the immunity of government
*A large part of the research upon which this article is based was done by
the authors in connection with the Harlan Fiske Stone Competition which is
sponsored annually by the Columbia University School of Law. The authors
were joint recipients of this award.

** Associated with the law firm of Bogle, Bogle & Gates, Seattle, Washington.

*** Special Attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
' See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 602, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 586
(1939),

in which he applies this descriptive phrase to Chief Justice Marshall's

dictum, "The power to tax involves the power to destroy."
Id. at
2 This expression is likewise from Justice Frankfurter's rhetoric.
59 Sup. Ct. at 604, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. at 587.
3 Id. at -, 59 Sup. Ct. at 601, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. at 584.
L. ed. 1427 (1938).
"304 U. S.405, 58 Sup. Ct. 969,82
6269 U. S.514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L.ed. 384 (1926).
611 Wall. 113. 20 L.ed. 122 (U.S.1871).
See 304 U. S.405, 424, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 977, 82 L. ed. 1427, 1439 (1938).

-,
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officers from income taxation, and which had dictated that unless the
presumption was rebutted the tax was qualitatively bad. The result of
the removal was to subject the immunity to a quantitative test where,
8
in effect, a presumption is raised against the existence of a "burden".
The test being unsatisfied, the Court stated the conclusion reached in the
Gerhardtcase as being ".. . that in terms of constitutional tax immunity

a federal income tax on the salary of an employee is not a prohibited
burden on the employer. .

. ."0

The reciprocal result of abolishing the

pro-forma immunity of federal employees from state taxation was
reached in the O'Keefe case.
The development, now in a sense completed, which lies between
Dobbins v. Commissioners0 and the O'Keefe case is the result of the
application of two mutually exclusive tests which the Supreme Court
evolved to deal with the problem of intergovernmental immunity. The
qualitative test invalidates a tax from the .mere form and subject of
taxation. The quantitative test prohibits only those taxes which in
"substance and effect" 11 put a "burden" on government. These concepts have been but vaguely articulated by the Supreme Court itself,
but in so far as it is possible, it is essential to essay a description of the
workings of the two tests, and what then remains unclear can perhaps
be explained away by an examination of the cases which have applied
one or the other of the tests.
The lines which can be drawn through the results, if not the reasoning, of the cases point to some probabilities of what will obtain in what
remains of the second century. These too will be examined in so -far
as the exploration seems constructive.

All intergovernmental immunity rests on the idea that the Constitution does not leave one government under the naked power and authority of the other.12 This notion was thought to be particularly apt in
'The terms qualitative and quantitative have been used in the analysis of the
clash between state and federal powers in the field of interstate commerce. South
Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U. S. 177, 58 Sup. Ct. 510,
82 L. ed. 734 (1938), (1938) 38 CoL. L. Rav. 1084.
" See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, - 59 Sup. Ct. 595,
601, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 583 (1939).
10 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (U. S. 1842).
", See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 386, 58 Sup. Ct.
623, 627, 82 L. ed. 907, 914 (1938).
122 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONs (8th ed. 1927) 989; 3 STORY ON
THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1891) C. III; WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936)
c. 2; WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1930) 95; Cooley, Limitations on. the State Tax Power (1868) 2
WEST. JuR. 69; Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional
Law (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 137; Gutkin, Taxing Tax-Immune Income (1938) 26
CALIF. L. REv. 579, 585; Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by
the Taxing Power of the State (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 321, 327.
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the field of taxation, the-most concentrated of powers; and at once it
was laid down as a qualitative rule that the revenue powers of one
government are not to be exerted directly on the other government.,,
It was not logically necessary to formulate the rule in such qualitative
terms, and thus to prohibit taxation to any extent whatsoever; the rule
itself rested on the premise that to expose one government to the power
of the other is to elevate the latter to such dominance that it will endanger the separate existence of the former. It seems reasonably plain
that this destruction would not be accomplished by a very slight tax.
However, the Court refused the task of judging what degree of taxation was necessary to sap the vitality of the taxed government, either
from a feeling of its own incompetence to make such a judgment, or
from its desire to erect a safeguard whose very elaborateness would give
due notice of the importance of the thing protected. In effect, the
Court raised a presumption as a barrier to be surmounted by those who
sought to prove that a given tax did not cripple the government on
which it was directly levied. This prohibition applied, it must be emphasized, only to taxes directly on the government, and did not block
the multitude of channels through which a government might in some
way feel the effect of taxes laid by another sovereign.
Supplementary to this first category of taxes, whose invalidity followed from the direct way in which they were levied, the Court supplied the conception of taxes which were levied only indirectly but
which passed on a "burden" to the government to which they in some
way related.-4 The inquiry was as to the "substance and effect" 15 of
these taxes, and invalidity followed only on a showing that the quantity
of the tax transmitted its weight through some middleman onto the
government itself.
It is not yet clear just what the Court will recognize as a quantitative "burden", because the concept has never been defined in terms
that will bear practical application. It may be that the subject seeking
exemption by satisfying this quantitative test is required only to prove
it highly probable that the government bears, in the end, the tax pro
13
McCiulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
14 See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 524, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 175,
70 L. ed. 384, 392 (1926) ; Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 230, 51 Sup. Ct. 125,
128, 75 L. ed. 304, 310 (1931) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134,
150, 58 Sup. Ct 208, 216, 82 L. ed. 155, 167 (1937) ; Helvering. v. Gerhardt, 304
U. S.405, 419, 59 Sup. Ct. 969, 974, 82 L. ed. 1427 -1436 (1938) ; Graves v. Nev
York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 599, 83 L. ed. Adv.

Ops. 577, 581 (1939). See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S.107, 150, 31
Sup. Ct. 342, 353, 55 L. ed. 389, 413 (1911); Educational Films Corp. v. Ward,
282 U. S.379, 389, 51 Sup. Ct 170, 172, 75 L. ed. 400, 405 (1931) ; Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U. S.123, 130, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 548, 76 L. ed. 1010, 1016 (1932).
15 See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S.376, 386, 58 Sup. Ct.
623, 627, 82 L. ed. 907, 914 (1938).
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tanto as levied, so that the final result is the same as though a tax were
put directly on the government.1" The Court may, on the other hand,
require that the indirect tax contested actually "obstruct the function"
of the government levied on before it will be called invalidyT It is
certain, only, that the Court will not be satisfied with proof of the
"...burden of a non-discriminatory general tax.., as may be passed on
to that government, through the effect of the tax on the price level
of labor or materials ...."18 Thus, in effect here, in order to protect
itself against the force of the fact that every tax levied by one government, by some devious route, will find its way to the other government
and manifest itself by some minute pressure, the Court has raised a
presumption against the existence of the "burden" that follows from
indirect taxation.
The twofold test thus devised has been the chaperone of a very
delicate relationship wherein Constitutional principles and practical considerations are of almost equal significance. It should not surprise
anyone to find much carpentry-by-hand in the cases and an inconstant
using and discarding of such tools as "proprietory-governmental" and
"essential-nonessential". Nor should it detract from the good-sense of
the distinctions finally worked out that the creators of the system we
are describing were one hundred years in labor.
...

II
The devising of the first category-the qualitative-may be credited
to Chief Justice Marshall. He first interpreted the Constitution as implying limitations on the state taxing power in McCulloch v. Maryland"9 and supplied the evangelizing phrase "the power to tax involves
the power to destroy", which has done yeoman service as a substitute for
reason. To admit the power to tax to any extent, it was thought, was
like allowing the first thin lick of flame to go unheeded. The tax, whatever its size, whatever its form, which allowed one government to exact
a levy from the other without any intermediate handlers was at once
bad without any further inquiry by the Court.
This conception, however, was tailored to fit only a few taxes such
as the property taxes, real and personal, on the property owned by the
government or an income tax levied on the revenues collected by the
state. The case is so strong against taxes such as these that the few
"See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 222, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 452,
72 L. ed. 857, 858 (1928) ; Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283, U. S.570,
579, 51 Sup. Ct 601, 604, 75 L. ed. 1277, 1283 (1931).
"'The O'Keefe case does not support either alternative to the exclusion of the
other.
There is much in Justice Stone's opinion to give currency to either view.
"8 See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe - U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595,
601, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 584 (1939).
10 See 4 Wheat. 316, 431, 4 L. ed. 579, 607 (U. S. 1819).
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attempts which have been made to levy them have been summarily
struck down.20 The Court, however, early used the qualitative concept
to invalidate taxes for which it was not fitted. This error was caused
by the more fundamental mistake of assuming that a tax on income is a
tax on the source from which it is derived. Thus, in Dobbins v. Colnnmissioners the tax laid directly on a federal officer's salary, and only
indirectly on his employer, was treated as though it were a tax directly
on the Federal Government and declared qualitatively bad. This fallacy
was adhered to in Collector v. Day,2' and again a tax laid only indirectly
on the Government was invalidated by the qualitative test which, as it
was pointed out above, was meant to apply only to taxes directly laid
on the Federal or state governments.
When the question of the tax on the income of government bondholders came before the Court, the majority went to great lengths to
reaffirm the principle that a tax on income is a tax on its origin, and
again the tax indirectly on the state was treated as though it were
direct.22

This tax, too, was held qualitatively bad.

The seductive

similarity between the Pollock case and that of a tax on the income of
the lessees of government lands was too much for the Court, and in
Gillespie v. Oklahoma23 and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.2 4 it
indulged the final exaggeration: a tax on the income of a lessee was said
.to be a tax on the lessor and a tax on the lessor government was presumed to be invalid. The reasoning at the edges was so thin that the
light inevitably came through, although it was sixteen years before the
25
Supreme Court acknowledged it.

The presumption of "burden" indulged as to taxes laid directly on
the government is not conclusive of the invalidity of the levy. It has
once or twice been rebutted. In South Carolina v. United States20 it
was shown to the Court that a liquor license tax levied directly on the
state government could be no "burden" on that government because of
the profit incident to the undertaking. This same reasoning served to
20Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L. ed. 845
(1886) ; Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed.
328 (1923); United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Delaware
County, 17 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
2111 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (U. S. 1871).
2 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39
L. ed. 759 (1895), on rehearing a.Orined, 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, 39 L. ed.
1108 (1895).
2 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922).
2285 U. S. 393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed. 815 (1932).
" Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L.
ed. 907 (1938), expressly overruled Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup.
Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922), and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed 815 (1932).
" 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 50 L. ed. 261 (1905) ; cf. Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U. S. 360, 54 Sup. Ct. 725, 78 L. ed. 1307 (1934).
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validate an amusement tax on the profits which the University of Georgia derived from allowing those outside the University to attend its
football games at a certain price per capita.27 The presumption has
likewise been rebutted as to state officers where they were paid out of
private funds.2 8
Here again, because the Court has not clearly defined "burden", it
is impossible to say what must be shown to rebut the presumption. The
area in which the presumption can be removed by proof of no "burden"
may be limited to those cases in which the government uses its powers
outside their natural orbit and derives a profit therefrom. 29 Again, it
may be that the Court will allow a slight tax directly on the government if it is first proved that the function taxed is not obstructed. The
Supreme Court may be called on to resolve the doubt by attempts, not
entirely unlikely, of the Federal Government to compel the states to pay
social security taxes for their employees or to support a program of
health insurance for their servants through the contribution of a per
capita amount.
III
The quantitative conception is fitted to protect the governments
against taxes which may reach them indirectly and yet with sufficient
force, in comparison with the original levy, as to make their effect as
dangerous as that of taxes laid directly. The Court has set forth the
quantitativetest in such vague form and language that it requires some
imagination to confine it within any given group of words. Emphasis
is placed on the "substance and effect"3 0 of the tax, and this would
seem to call for an examination of the facts. Such indeed was the
attitude of the Court in Willcuts v. Bunn3l where the complaint was
made that no facts were given the Court. It was then pointed out by
Justice Stone in Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States32 that the most
important fact-the ultimate incidence of the tax-was in no case available to the Court, and in Helvering v. Gerhardt the Court actually
refused the proffer of facts8 3 to attempt the demonstration of the
"burden".
" Allen v. Regents of the University of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439, 58 Sup. Ct.
980, 82 L. ed. 1448 (1938).
" Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.-S. 214, 55 Sup. Ct. 171, 79 L. ed. 291 (1934).
2 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S.437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, 50 L. ed.
261 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S.360, 54 Sup. Ct. 725, 78 L. ed. 1307
(1934).
" Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S.376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82
L. ed. 907 (1938).
" See 282 U. S.216, 230, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 129, 75 L. ed. 304, 309 (1931).
" See 283 U. S.570, 581, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 605, 75 L. ed. 1277, 1284 (1931).
" See Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 12-16, petition denied, - U. S.
- 59 Sup. Ct. 57, 83 L. ed. Adv.Ops. 27 (1938).
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Satisfactory proof of a quantitative "burden" has been made in at
least two cases where taxes bearing only indirectly on the government
were in question. In Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox 4 an excise on gasoline collected from the seller was held bad as to gasoline sold to the
government. It was thought highly probable that because the tax was
measured by the same units in which the commodity was sold to the
government the result would be to raise the price of the gasoline per
gallon by the amount of the tax. The final result was as though the
buyer, instead of the seller, paid the tax directly. On exactly the same
reasoning the Court reached a similar result where the tax was a manufacturers' excise on motorcycles sold to the government, measured by
the number of machines sold, and paid by the seller. 35
There are grounds, however, for believing that proof that the government bears an indirect tax pro tanto as levied is no longer a satisfactory demonstration of a "burden". 3 6 If this belief proves justified
it will be necessary to prove an actual obstruction of the functioning of
government before a tax will be declared quantitatively invalid.
It appears, after some experience with the quantitative test, that the
Court has, in effect, raised a presumption against the existence of a
"burden" in the cases to which it is applied. Certain it is that the Court
has in no instance, save the two cited above, granted an exemption on
the quantitative showing of a "burden". It has been quick to conclude
that there was no "burden" where there was both a net and gross income tax on those contracting with the government, 7 an excise tax on
gasoline sold to a government contractor, 88 and a capital gains tax on
the sale of government bonds. 39
In the light of the qualitative-quantitativeanalysis, the changes in
position which the Court has made during the past two years become
more understandable. The Gerhardt case, standing by itself, is an
enigma, chiefly because it was couched in the equivocal terms which
the Court had from time to time used as tools in working at the inter"277 U. S.218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857 (1928).
Indiarf Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S.570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75 L.
ed. 1277 (1931).
" See Chief Justice Hughes' statement that Indian Motocycle Co. v. United
States and Panhandle Oil Co. v.Knox "have been distinguished and must be
deemed to be limited to their particular facts" inJames v.Dravo Contracting Co.,
302 U. S.134, 151, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 217, 82 L. ed. 155, 168 (1937). See Justice
Stone's opinion in Hielvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 423, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 977,
82 L. ed. 1427, 1439 (1938).
" Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S.514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed. 384
(1926) (where tax was levied on net income of partners, derived from partnership business) ; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S.134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208,
82 L. ed. 155 (1937) (where tax was levied on gross income from corporation's
business).
" Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S.466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78
L. ed. 918 (1934).
"'Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. 304 (1931).
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governmental problem. It appeared to make a distinction between certain classes of governmental employees (those engaged in the "essential"
functions of government) and certain other classes (those in the "nonessential" functions), leaving the former immune qualitatively. This
suspicion of distinction was further bolstered by the request of Justice
Black, concurring, that Collector v. Day be overruled, a request which
was explicitly denied in the majority opinion. 40 But, for the first time,
full-time employees of the government were denied a qualitative protection, and, for the first time, a quantitative test was applied to such
employees. The latter test was declared unsatisfied as it was thought
that no real "burden" was transmitted to the government by the tax.
This offered the prophecy that if the "essential" government officers
were ever deprived of the protection of the qualitative test, they too
would be unable to show a "burden" that would satisfy the quantitative
test.
The O'Keefe case, as has been noted above, offers a full explanation
of the Gerhardt case. It goes to the unprecedented lengths of overruling expressly a case as to which no specific question was before the
Court-Collector v. Day. It is highly probable that this would never
have been done had not the Court considered Collector v. Day overruled in effect in the Gerhardtcase, despite the language to the contrary.
Thus, the distinction which is hinted at in the Gerhardt case may be
said to have no significance whatever; all state officers now stand on a
single plane for purposes of inter-governmental taxation. Justice Stone
points out in the O'Keefe case that there is no possibility of drawing a
similar line as to separate federal employees since the National Government is one of delegated powers, and all its acts, done in pursuance of
its powers, are therefore "essential" or "governmental". 41
Once these side issues have been cleared away, it becomes plain that
the real service of the Gerhardt and O'Keefe cases was to abolish the
illogical notion that a "tax on income is legally or economically a tax on
its source". 42 From this it followed that a tax on an officer of a government was in no sense a tax directly on that government, and there"0See 304 U. S. 405, 425, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 977, 82 L. ed. 1427, 1440 (1938).
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stone, makes it plain that Collector v.
Day is not overruled by the Gerhardt case, id. at 424, 58 Sup. Ct. at 977, 82 L. ed.
at 1439.

"' See the majority opinion in the O'Keefe case where it is said: "...
the federal government is one of delegated powers in the exercise of which Congress is
supreme; so that every agency which Congress can constitutionally create is a
governmental agency." -- U. S. 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 597, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops.

577, 579 (1939).
"' This idea had already been repudiated in New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,

300 U. S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466, 81 L. ed. 666 (1937), where a tax was sustained
on the income received by a New York resident from the rental of New Jersey
land.
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fore qualitative protection against such a tax could no longer be countenanced. Applying then the quantitative test, Justice Stone concludes
that ". . . we cannot say that the present tax on the income of its
employees lays any unconstitutional burden upon it [the government
agency] .-"
Exactly this same reasoning had been used, shortly before the Gerhardt case was decided, on the problem of the income of the lessees of
government lands. In Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.44 Chief
Justice Hughes had reached the similar result of abolishing the immunity which had enveloped the lessees of government oil lands and of
allowing the tax to be levied on the income derived from such lands.

IV
The similarity of reasoning in these cases points to the conclusion
that it is a widespread principle which has been overruled and that its
effects may be felt as far away as in the field of government bonds. It
appears to be inevitable that the Court will no longer view the immunity
of government bonds as a qualitative problem. It will begin to ask to
be shown a realistic "burden", and it will be armed with a presumption
with which to thwack any petitioner who argues generalities, principles,
or levels of any kind, be they price, wage, or interest.
This does not mean, as some have supposed, that the immunity of
bondholders from income taxation is now so flimsy as to be virtually
nonexistent. The way is left open to prove an actual "burden", and
that may not be as difficult here as it has proved to be elsewhere. In
the highly organized money markets where government bonds are dealt
in and delicate margins clearly reflected, the item of tax immunity may
well bulk large in determining price, salability, and interest rates. 45 It
is probable that some slight adjustment in interest rates as to federal
bonds, due to the abolition of the immunity, would not be a great hardship on the National Government, and it is hard to believe that any great
difficulty in marketing would spring from such abolition. But this may
not be true as to the small local units of government such as municipalities and sanitation or school districts. Their plight in the recent depression years has been precarious, their sources of revenues are pressed
to the utmost, and debt limits have been reached in many cases. It
"3The Court does not deny the presence of any "burden", but such as does
obtain is "... . but the normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two governments, each possessing the taxing power."

Graves v. New

York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 601, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
577, 584 (1939).
"303
U. S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. 907 (1938).
5

' POWELL, NATIONAL TAXATION OF STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES, UNIVERSITY OF
IN SOCIAL SCIENCEs (1936); Osgood, Effect of Taxation on
Securities (1920) 77 ANNALS 156.
ILLINOIS STUDIEs
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might be clearly indicated to the Court that bankruptcy would be the
46
result of taxing their interest payments.
V
The O'Keefe case would seem to have another important implication
in setting at rest a controversy that has been much hgitated recently.
It has been argued, notably by members of the present administration
in Washington, that the Federal Government had a source of power
to tax state officers and bonds in the Sixteenth Amendment. 47 In effect,
their position was a revival of the view taken by some during the time
that the Amendment was before the country for ratification. It was
argued that the Amendment was a grant of power to Congress to tax
income in the hands of all United States citizens, regardless of its origin.
It was a plea for a simple, literal interpretation of the Amendment's
words: "from whatever source derived". 48 Views of those in positions
of authority at the time of the adoption were almost equally divided as
to whether the words were intended to cover the income of government
employees and bondholders. The Supreme Court, in a line of decisions
beginning with the Brushaber" case, held that the Amendment, read in
its setting, did not grant the Congress any power to tax employees or
bondholders of state governments.
The Supreme Court has, by the O'Keefe case, indicated that it does
not choose to reopen that issue in so far as the immunity of government officers is concerned, and prefers to predicate the power of the
Federal Government to tax state officers on the ground of the absence
of any "burden". This, it will be noted, is the most moderate way
available for the effecting of the tax: if the Amendment's interpretation
had been changed it would have deprived the Court of any brake on
intergovernmental taxation, even though it might be shown that the
state was suffering a "burden" therefrom. The possibility still remains,
however, that the Sixteenth Amendment will be used to give the FedAND READER, RECENT FEDERAL-CiTY RELATIONS (1936)
CHA=RES, PROBLEM OF MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC FINANCE (1933).
"' See Message of President Roosevelt on Taxation delivered to the Congress
on April 25, 1938, 83 CONG. REc. 5683 (1938). See also Study of the Department
of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) Part II.
48 Views of the members of the Congress which adopted the Amendment may
be found in 44 CONG. REC., 1568; 1680; 4067; 4399 (1909). Typical of the views
expressed by officials while the Amendment was before the states for ratification
were those of Governor Hughes in his Special Message from the Govertor, New
York Senate, No. 3 (1910) and those of Senator Elihu Root, 45 CONG. REc. 2539

'" BETTERS, WILLIAMS

1-4, 13-14;

(1910).
" Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. ed.

493 (1916) ; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 60 L.
ed. 546 (1916); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. ed
521 (1920).
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eral Government power to tax the income from state and local bonds.
Such a course would be in line with the argument that the Amendment
was adopted to effect the reversal of the Pollock"° case, in which the
immunity for bonds was laid down.
VI
In the O'Keefe case the Court also indicated in somewhat confusing
terms the true nature of the tax immunity of federal agencies which was
adopted but not christened in McCulloch v. Maryland. The question 5 '
as to whether this immunity is "constitutional" or "statutory"5 2 seems
finally to have been answered in favor of the latter view.5 3
The earliest position 54 taken by the Court subsequent to McCulloch
v. Maryland appeared
to be that the immunity of federal agencies was
"constitutional" 55 in nature, although certain intermediate statements50
of the Court might have been construed to furnish adequate grounds
for predicating all immunity upon the will of Congress. The subsequent
rationale of Collector v. Day and the recent interpretation of the Dobbins case, given by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the
O'Keefe case, substantiate this conclusion. The approach of the O'Keefe
case, however, is that the immunity of federal instrumentalities is dependent upon the intent of Congress.
A powerful analogy to force the Court to this position may be found
in the interstate commerce cases, where the immunity of interstate
commerce from state regulation has finally been resolved as being
"'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L.
ed. 759 (1895), on rehearing affirmed, 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, 39 L. ed.
1108 (1895).
51 The question may also be framed as to whether the limitation on the statq

taxing power is a true "constitutional" limitation or one arising from conflict with
the statutory will of Congress.
"Dowling, Cheatham, and Hale, Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution (1936)
36 COL. L. REv. 351, 357, indicating that the immunity is "constitutional". Legis.
(1935) 35 COL. L. Rxv. 429, 435, n. 49, indicating that the immunity is "statutory".
"A true "constitutional" immunity of federal officers in the sense here used
would, by definition, be one to be enjoyed regardless of any expression of intent
on the part of Congress, whereas a "statutory" immunity would be one dependent
for its existence upon Congressional will. Realistically viewed, a "constitutional"
immunity is one declared by the Court, whereas a "statutory" immunity is one
established by Congress.
5, Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (U. S.
1842). The question immediately decided concerned the immunity of federal officers. The language of the opinion, however, encompassed a broader scope and
indicated that federal agencies were constitutionally immune from state taxation.
55 One of the two grounds given for the decision, i.e., that the tax was in conflict with the Congressional act fixing Dobbins' salary, would indicate that the
immunity was "statutory", but the opinion appears to be largely rested on the
fact that such a tax would run afoul of the "constitutional" limitation on the
power of the state to -tax, which was conceived to have been laid down in McCul-

loch5 v. Maryland.

See the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United

States, 9 Wheat. 738, 865, 6 L. ed. 204, 234 (U. S. 1824).
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"statutory" in character.57 Chief Justice Marshall's dictum,5 8 indicating
that the immunity of interstate commerce is "constitutional" in nature,
has given way to the conception that the state's inability to regulate
interstate commerce arises not from a "constitutional" denial of power,
but because of a conflict with the will of Congress. 59 It is by means
of this theory that Congress has consented to the state's subjecting to

state law intoxicants6" or convict-made goods,61 even though those goods
are in the original package. It is by this theory that the Court has permitted Congress to consent to state laws effectually regulating commerce 2 beyond the state borders. 63 When it is remembered that the
interstate commerce immunity also originated in reliance upon McCulloch v. Maryland,6 4 the analogy appears to be peculiarly apt. 65
" The development of the theory that the immunity of interstate commerce
results from a conflict between the states' powers and Congressional intent is
completely discussed in Bikli, The Silence of Congress (1927) 41 HARV. L. REV.
200; Black, The Significance of the "Divesting Theory" in the Regulation of Milk
(1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 589; Ribble, National and State Cooperation Under the Commnerce Clause (1937) 37 COL. L. Ray. 43; Symposium on Cooperative Federalism
(1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 455.
8 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 448, 6 L. ed. 678, 689 (U. S. 1827).
" While the immunities enjoyed by interstate commerce from state regulation
and federal instrumentalities from state taxation are similar in that they are
"statutory", the approach of the Court in the two cases seems to differ in that
immunity of interstate commerce may be inferred from the silence of Congress,
whereas no immunity will be granted federal agencies unless Congress specifically
exempts them.
"Wilson Act, 26 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. A. §121 (Supp. 1938): intoxicating liquors "... transported into any State or Territory.

.

. shall upon arrival

in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of

such State or Territory. . . ." Upheld in In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct.

865, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891).
" Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U. S. C. A. §60 (Supp. 1938):
prison-made goods ".... shall upon arrival and delivery in such State or Territory
be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory...."
Upheld in Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 80 L. ed. 778 (1936).
" Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. §122 (Supp. 1938),
where it is provided that shipment of intoxicating liquor from one state into another state which is intended to be used in violation of any law of such state is
prohibited. Upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S.
311, 37 Sup. Ct 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917). Ashurst-Summers Act, 49 STAT. 494
(1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §61 (Supp. 1938), where substantially the same provisions
are made for the state regulation of prison-made goods as the Webb-Kenyon Act
made for intoxicants. Upheld in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 299 U. S. 334, 57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81 L. ed. 270 (1937). See also South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 58 Sup. Ct. 510,
82 L. ed. 734 (1938) ; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S.
346, 59 Sup. Ct. 528, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 495 (1939).
" To the effect that these cases cannot be rationalized on the grounds that the
statutes merely "divested" the articles of their interstate character, see Dowling
and Hubbard, Divesting an Article of Its Interstate Character (1921) 5 Mi~N. L.
Rav. 100, 253; Powell, The Validity of State Legislation Under the Webb-Kenyon
Act (1917) 2 So. L. Q. 112; Ribble, National and State Cooperation Under the
Commerce Clause (1937) 37 CoL L. REv. 43.
"1The immunity of interstate commerce was squarely rested on McCdloch v.
Maryland, "the decision in which case is, we think," said Chief Justice Marshall,
"entirely applicable to this". See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 449, 6 L. ed.
678, 689 (U. S. 1827).
11 The nature of the federal system may also indicate that the immunity of
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The language of Justice Stone in the O'Keefe case, to the end that
tax immunity is "statutory", is, however, decidedly confusing. In
adopting his own previous intimation 0 that such immunity is dependent
upon Congressional intent, and that the states may tax federal agencies
if Congress consents, he uses these words:
"And since the power to create the agency includes the implied power
to do whatever is needful or appropriate, if not expressly prohibited, to
protect the agency, there has been attributed to Congress some scope,
the limits of which it is not now necessary to define, for granting or
' 7
vithholding immunity of federal agencies from state taxation."
(Italics
supplied)
Continuing in the same paragraph, he describes this immunity which
Courts have implied in the absence of Congressional mandate as a "constitutional immunity". If all the Court means by "constitutional immunity" is that Congress may establish such by fiat if it chooses, that
the*Courts may imply it if Congress fails to do so, and that Congress
may remove it by consent if it so desires, then "constitutional" 08 would
seem to be a confusing description of it; and the language of the Court
will serve poorly to clarify the cloudy thinking with which McCulloch
v. Maryland has blessed us.

VII
If, however, it be assumed that this federal immunity is in truth
"statutory" in character, the O'Keefe opinion throws considerable light
on the probable future handling of the problem of immunity of federal
agencies and instrumentalities. Here, the Court refused to infer that
Congress had intended to render salaries of Home Owners' Loan Corinterstate commerce and the immunity of government instrumentalities and officers
is identical. The Constitution gave to Congress certain very bload and extensive
powers. Among them -was the power to regulate commerce among the states.
Above all else it was deemed important that the Federal Government, and not the
states, have this power. Yet, the Court has held that Congress can consent to the
states' exercise of that power. As Congress may consent to the states' exercise of
this most national and extensive of its powers, it would seem to follow that Congress may consent to the taxation of the officers and employees who carry into
execution those powers.
66 Note the following language in the Gerhardt case wherein the Court opened
the door to a question not then before it: "Since the acts of Congress within its
constitutional powei are supreme, the validity of state taxation of federal instrumentalities must depend (a) on the power of Congress to create the instrumentality
and (b) its intent to protect it from state taxation." Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U. S. 405, 411, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 971, 82 L. ed. 1427, 1432 (1938).
67 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, -,
59 Sup. Ct 595,
597, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 579 (1939).
66 "Constitutional" immunity may be defined as involving a conditional limitation
on the taxing power of the states, i.e., a constitutional inability unless Congress
consents either affirmatively or by implication. In this light the Court's language
may be consistent. However, it seems more accurate to describe such an immunity
as "statutory".
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poration employees tax exempt from its silence upon the subject.6 9 In
prior cases the Court has indicated that Congress might, if it chose,
subject its agencies to state taxation in the face of an otherwise implied
immunity. 70 The opinion of the O'Keefe case, on the other hand, indi00 Note that "Congress has declared in §4 of the Act that the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation is an instrumentality of the United States and that its bonds
are exempt, as to principal and interest, from federal and state taxation", whereas
no mention is made of salaries of employees. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
- U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 597, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 580 (1939).
"' The silence of Congress has previously been taken to indicate an intended
tax immunity for a federal agency or instrumentality. Dobbins v. Commissioners,
of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (U. S. 1842); King County v. U. S.
Shipping Board, 282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922); cf. Federal Land Bank v.
Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 235, 55 Sup. Ct. 705, 708, 79 L. ed. 1408, 1413 (1935)
(where Congressional silence was held to imply no immunity from judicial process,
which is "less readily implied than immunity from taxation").
Congress may, however, by consent, allow federal agencies or instrumentalities
to be taxed, e.g.: national bank stock: Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 18
L. ed. 229 (U S. 1865) ; People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, 25 L. ed. 705 (1879) ;
Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 7 Sup. Ct. 826, 30 L. ed. 895
(1887) ; Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438, 11 Sup. Ct. 594, 35 L. ed.
210 (1891) ; Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537,
43 L. ed. 850 (1899) ; First Nat. Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258 U. S. 362, 42
Sup. Ct. 323, 66 L. ed. 661 (1922); Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather, 263
U. S. 103, 44 Sup. Ct. 23, 68 L. ed. 191 (1923); First Nat. Bank v. Hartford, 273
U. S. 548, 47 Sup. Ct. 462, 71 L. ed. 767 (1927); Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax
Comm., 297 U. S. 209, 56 Sup. Ct. 417, 80 L. ed. 586 (1936) ; compare Schweppe,
State Taxation of National Bank Stock (1922) 6 MINN. L. Rrv. 219; national bank

notes: compare Howard Savings Inst. v. Newark, 63 N. J. Law 547, 44 At. 654
(1899) with McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819);
franchises of national banks: Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664,
19 Sup. Ct. 537, 43 L. ed. 850 (1899) ; First Nat. Bank of Gulfport v. Adams, 258

U. S. 362, 42 Sup. 323, 66 L. ed. 661 (1922) ; federal lands; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L. ed. 845 (1886) ; Nevada v. Central
Pacific R. R., 20 Nev. 372, 22 Pac. 237 (1889); lessees of government lands:
Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Corp., 296 U. S. 521, 56 Sup. Ct. 340, 80 L. ed. 366 (1936) ;
British-American Co. v. Board, 299 U. S. 159, 57 Sup. Ct. 132, 81 L. ed. 95
(1936) ; cf. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575, 48 Sup. Ct. 333, 72
L. ed. 709 (1928) (where Congressional silence was construed as implying consent) ; property of corporations whose stock is wholly owned by the United States:
47 STAT. 9 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. §610 (1938) (Reconstruction Finance Corporation) ; 48 STAT. 1256 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. §1725(e) (1936) (Federal Savings and Loan Corporation) ; 48 STAT. 1252 '(1934), 12 U. S. C. A. §1714 (1936)
(Federal Housing Administration) ; 48 STAT. 129 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. §1463(c)
(1936) (Home Owners' Loan Corporation); 48 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A.
§264(p) (1936) (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 48 STAT. 347 (1934),
12 U. S. C. A. §1020(f) (1936) (Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation) ; 48 STAT.
268 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §1134(c) (1936) (Production Credit Corporation);
39 STAT. 380 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. §931 (1936) (Federal Land Banks).
To be distinguished are cases where Congress has expressly created an

exemption 'which otherwise would not have been implied. Smith v. Kansas City

Title Co., 255 U. S. 180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 (1921) ; Federal Land Bank
v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct 385, 67 L. ed. 703 (1923) ; cf. Thomson
v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579, 19 L. ed. 792 (U. S. 1869) ; Central Pacific R. R.
v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. 766, 40 L. ed. 903 (1896) ; James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. ed. 155 (1937) ; Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1938) (in these cases
the Court intimated that Congress could create an exemption by specific enactment).
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cates that Congress may, if it chooses, render federal instrumentalities
tax exempt.7 ' The Court states that
"... it is plain that there is no basis for implying a purpose of Congress
to exempt the federal government or its agencies from tax burdens which
are unsubstantial or which courts are unable to discern." 7 2 (Italics
supplied)
Apparently, the silence of Congress is to be taken by the Court to indicate that Congress intends no immunity. What tax burdens will be
viewed as substantial, and which, thus, may give rise to an implied
immunity even in face of Congressional silence, remains open for
conjecture.
The immunity of state agencies from federal taxation, in contrast
to the position of federal agencies, seems to be truly "constitutional"
in character and exists independently of the power of the state legislatures to alter it.73 A more useful and realistic analysis would indicate, perhaps, that the taxing power of neither government extends to
"burdening" the other, but that the judgment of Congress establishes
what constitutes a "burden" in the case of a state tax on federal agencies, whereas the Court determines it in the case of a federal tax on
state agencies. The fact that the states are provided with no "supremacy clause" with which to protect their agencies and instrumentalities also points to the conclusion that this immunity exists independently
of the legislative will of the state governments. 74 Another analogy of
considerable force, which may lead the Court to the conclusion that the
states cannot consent to taxation of their own agencies, can also be
found in the argument that since state consent cannot enlarge the scope
of delegated powers, 75 therefore, it cannot expand the federal taxing
71The refusal to imply from Congressional silence an intended immunity has
previously been employed in situations remotely connected with governmental
functions. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575, 48 Sup. Ct. 333,
72 L. ed. 709 (1928) (where land purchased for an Indian citizen, and subject to
a restriction made by the Secretary of the Interior and the county court that the
land should not be leased or alienated during the lifetime of the grantee up to a
certain date, was refused immunity from state taxation).
" Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. - -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 598,
83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 581 (1939).
" This analysis would force a curious reversal of the rationale of Chief Justice

Marshall in McCidloch. v. Maryland, by establishing a tax on state agencies as
being constructively outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to tax,
whereas, federal agencies, by Congressional consent, would be permissible objects

of state taxation.
"' Compare the language of the O'Keefe case, indicating that the immunity of
federal agencies is predicated upon the power of Congress to create and protect
them. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -- -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595,
597, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 579 (1939).
"I Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918);
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S.20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817
(1922) ; Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837,
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power where there is an implied "constitutional" limitation upon such
exercise of the power. 70 A contrary position would seem to be indi7
cated, however, by the line of argument taken in the Bekins case. 7
There, state consent was viewed as essential in validating the exercise
of an admittedly possessed delegated power (the bankruptcy power) in
78
a manner which, but for this consent, would not be permissible.
Although the bankruptcy power is in certain aspects exclusively
federal and not possessed by the states, it may well be that this line of
analysis will lead the Court to hold that the states can consent to the
exercise upon state agencies of the federal taxing power,79 which, in
all other respects, is concededly plenary and concurrent with the state
8
taxing power,80 in so far as that exercise does not involve coercion. '
Perhaps this exercise of federal power will be viewed as analogous to
the exercise of power under review in the Bekins decision, rather than
an invasion of the reserved powers of the states.8 2 Whether or not the
Court will allow the state legislatures to substitute their judgments for
that of the Court as to the "burden" of a federal tax on state instrumentalities remains to be seen.
VIII
While the O'Keefe case explicitly holds that there is no implied income tax immunity for the salaries of federal officers and employees, it
leaves unanswered the question as to the power of Congress, by statute,
to render federal officers immune from state taxation.82 ' No power would
79 L. ed. 1570 (1935) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80
L. ed. 477 (1936) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80

L. ed. 1160 (1936) ; Ashton v. Cameron County Wbater Improvement Dist. No. 1,

298 U. S. 513, 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. 1309 (1936).

78 This argument assumes that the implied limitation is qualitative and .prevents
any exercise of the power upon certain objects, rather than assuming that the
limitation is a quantitative one upon the manner in which the power is exercised.
"United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 58 Sup. Ct. 811, 82 L. ed. 1137 (1938).
78 Cf. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S.
513, 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. 1309 (1936).
71 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed.
1279 (1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 57 Sup. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed. 1307
(1937).
It may be noted that the ends sought in these cases were practically
unattainable by any other means (the power involved in the Bekins case was exclusively federal). Also, positive tangible benefits were conferred upon the state
governments. Whether or not these factors render the Bekins and Steward cases
sui generis in their indication of potential expansion of federal powers via state
consent is open to question.
"' See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425, 432, 4 L. ed. 579, 606, 608
(U. S. 1819).
81 Cf. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S.
513, 56 Sup. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. 1309 (1936).
82 See note 75, supra.
82 Since this article went to galley the Supreme Court has held that Home
Owners' Loan Corporation mortgages could not be subjected to a Maryland recording tax in the face of a Congressional declaration that bonds and loans of the
Corporation shall be exempt from state taxation. Pittman v. Home Owners'
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seem to exist in the states to establish, by statute, an immunity to replace the Constitutional immunity abolished by the O'Keefe case, since

the states possess no "supremacy clause" by which to defeat the operation of the federal taxing statute.83 The Court refers to the operation
of the federal power in this respect in the following language from the
majority opinion:
"....

Such differences as there may be between the implied tax immunity

of a state and the corresponding immunity of the national government

and its instrumentalities may be traced to the fact that the national gov-

ernment is one of delegated powers, in the exercise of which it is su-

preme. Whatever scope this may give to the national government to
claim immunity from state taxation of all instrumentalities which it

may constitutionally create, and whatever authority Congress may possess as incidental to the exercise of its delegated powers to grant or
withhold immunity from state8 4taxation, Congress has not sought in this
case to exercise such power."

This statement seems pregnant with the admission that perhaps the
states have been led into a neat trap which might well be set by a Congress intent on federal supremacy. The overruling of Collector v. Day
opens wide the avenue to taxation of state officers and employees and,
perhaps, state bonds.8 5 But the avenue may prove to be a one-way
street should Congress attempt to render federal employees and bonds
tax-exempt at some not wholly inconceivable time in the future.
The guarded language of the O'Keefe case, however, indicates that
Loan Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 6, 1939. Although the opinion recognizes the

power of Congress under the "supremacy" and "necessary and proper" clauses to
exempt federal instrumentalities from nondiscriminatory state taxation, the Court
has apparently deferred decision as to what immunity will still be implied in the
absence of a Congressional exemption. The intimation is.perhaps that no distinctions -will be drawn. The Court also failed to throw further light upon the
question as to whether the "necessary and proper" clause may be utilized to render
the income of federal officers immune from state taxation.
:'Compare U. S. CosT., Art. VI, §2.
8'Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, -, 59 Sup. Ct. 595,
601, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 583 (1939).
It is interesting to note that in differentiating the two immunities the Court
paid no attention to the argument developed in McCulloch v. Maryland, and expounded as late as the Gerhardt case, that one reason for the immunity of federal
officers would be that to allow taxation of such would be to allow the part to tax
the whole, whereas, the same could not be said of federal taxation of state instrumentalities. The speciousness of this argument as a curb on state powers
would seem -to be further indicated in view of the vast expansion of the executive
and administrative branches of the Federal Government, where the parts can be no
more truly said to be represented than is the Federal Government represented in
the state legislatures.
ss As suggested above, the tests being evolved by the Court may ultimately
sanction the federal taxation of state activity if it imposes no "burden". In this
event the Court would be confronted with the additional inquiry and danger as
to -whether or not the tax was a coercive measure effecting a regulation of state
activity and an invasion of the reserved powers of the states. Cf. Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449; 66 L. ed. 817 (1922).
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this load of political dynamite may eventually prove to be a dead head.
Justice Stone, with a weather-eye perhaps more to practical effects than
to logical consistency, cautiously intimates that perhaps Congress could
not render the officers and employees of the Federal Government immune from state taxation even though it chose to do so. In addition to
the passages quoted above he states:
"Whether its power to grant tax exemptions as an incident to the exercise of powers specifically granted by the Constitution can ever, in any
circumstances, extend beyond the constitutional immunity of federal
agencies which courts have implied, is a question which need not now
be determined." 86
Referring to the Gerhardt case, he further points out that:
"....

as applied to the taxation of salaries of the employees of one gov-

ernment, the purpose of the immunity was not to confer benefits on the
employees by relieving them from contributing their share of the financial support of the other government, whose benefits they enjoy, or to
give an advantage to that government by enabling it to engage employees at salaries lower than those' paid for like services by other
employers, public or private, but to prevent undue interference with
87
the one government by imposing on ft the tax burdens of the other."
Reading these two portions of the opinion together, it may well appear
that the Court is suggesting that the Congress lacks power to render
its officers tax immune where the immunity does not serve to "prevent
undue interference with the one government by imposing on it the tax
burdens of the other". Where the immunity attempted to be created
by Congress merely relieves federal officers from "contributing their
share of the financial support of the other government", or where it
serves only to place the Federal Government in a "better competitive
so

Graves v. New York ex reL. O'Keefe, -

U. S. -,

-,

59 Sup. Ct. 595,

597, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 579 (1939). Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Crosland,
261 U. S.374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L.'ed. 703 (1923) ; Smith v. Kansas City Title

Co., 255 U. S.180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 (1921). In the latter case coun-.
sel argued: "There is no implied, as there certainly is no express, power in Congress to exempt property from state taxation. If exemption exists it is because
it is essential to some federal instrumentality to which the property belongs. It
exists then by force of the Constitution and it is for the Court to declare it in
interpreting the Constitution. And Congress cannot, by any declaration, create an
exemption which would not have existed independently." Id. at 185. Justice Day,
however, expressly stated, "Deciding as we do that these institutions have been
created by Congress in the exercise of its legitimate authority, we think the power
to make these securities here involved tax exempt necessarily follows. . . .That
the Federal Government, if it sees fit to do so, can exempt such securities from
taxation seems obvious upon the clearest principles." Id. at 211, 41 Sup. Ct. at
249, 65 L. ed. at 590.
" Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, - U. S. -, -,
59 Sup. Ct. 595,
600, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 577, 583 (1939).
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position in the labor market", it may well be that the Court will hold
such an attempt ineffective.8 7 ,
In summary, it would seem that the agencies of both governments
enjoy immunity from direct taxation by the other government, while
the officers of neither are so protected. It would also appear that
whereas Congress is to be denied the power to render its officers immune, it may still consent to direct taxes placed by the states on federal
agencies. Thus, the Court is well started on the way toward establishing a reciprocity of immunity between the two governments.
IX
The O'Keefe case also forced the Court to reconsider a companion
problem in the realm of tax immunities. Although the non-sequitur of
Collector v. Day-in the words of Justice Stone, "that the taxpayer is
clothed with the implied constitutional tax immunity of the government
by which he is employed"-is not the same as that of Evans v. Gore,8 8
namely, that a tax by the employing government is a diminution of
salary, nevertheless, the rationale of the O'Keefe decision indicates that
whatever tax immunity, state or federal, 89 the President and federal
judges enjoy rests not on any implied immunity, but specifically upon
Article II, Section 7 and Article III, Section 1 of the Federal Constitution. Therefore, so far as state taxation of these officers is concerned,
it appears that the O'Keefe case allows the states to tax their incomes,
unless the Court elects to take the position that all taxation, whether
by the states or by the employing Federal Government, is a diminution
of salary, and hence forbidden. Such an exception to the O'Keefe
case rationale, that all federal employees should contribute to the support of the state governments whose protection they enjoy, would seem
to imply, if carried to its absurd logical conclusion, that the village
" Compare with the foregoing language of the O'Keefe case the following
excerpt from the concluding paragraph of the opinion in Pittman v. Home Owners'
Loan Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 6, 1939, cited supra note 82a: "Congress has not
only the power to create a corporation to facilitate the performance of governmental functions, but has the power to protect the operations thus validly authorized . . . for the exercise of this power to protect the lawful activities of its
agencies, Congress has the dominant authority which necessarily inheres in its
action within the national field."
8 253 U, S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 64 L. ed. 887 (1920).
Il It may be considered that the question of federal tax immunity of these
officers is an academic question, except as to judges incumbent on June 6, 1932,
inasmuch as Congress has provided, "In the case of Presidents of the United
States and judges of courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932,
the compensation received as such shall be included in gross income; and all Acts
fixing the compensation of such Presidents and judges are hereby amended accordingly." 47 STAT. 178 (1932), 48 STAT. 686 (1934), 52 STAT. 457 (1938), 26
U. S. C. A. §22(a) (Supp. 1938). See also 2 C. C. H. 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. 5.
However, if the rationale of Evans v. Gore is strictly followed, it would seem that
the same constitutional question would be involved in the event that the tax rates
were raised above those which existed when the official took office.
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plumber or any other third party, as well as the state government,
would be unable to collect his bill for services rendered to a federal
judge, since to do so would diminish the constitutionally protected
salary. Thus, the O'Keefe case has forced the Court to either of two
additional positions. It may elect to stand by the strict holding of
Evans v. Gore, and yet allow the states to tax all federal officers, including judges, under the doctrine of the O'Keefe case. In this event the
Court would find itself engaging in the sleight-of-hand of holding an
income tax to be, and yet not to be, a diminution of salary, depending
on whether it was levied by the employing government. The other
alternative would entail the overruling of Evans v. Gore and realistically holding that a non-discriminatory income tax by either government is not a diminution of salary within the meaning of the Constitutional provisions. That this latter position is to be taken is indicated
by the recent decision in the Woodrough case.90 Although the Court
in this case was not forced expressly to overrule Evans v. Gore, inasmuch as Judge Woodrough had taken office subsequent to June 6, 1932,
and his compensation was thereby deemed to be governed by Section
22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 91 nevertheless, the opinion clearly
intimates that Evans v. Gore is also poised for the axe.
With this final chapter in the long and muddled history of the tax
immunity problem about to be written, it appears that the Court once
more has molded together judicial theory and political exigency in working out a solution of another intricate problem in the balance of federal
and state relationships within our federalism.
"O'Malley v. Woodrough,- -

850 (1939).

" See note 89, supra.

U. S. -,

59 Sup. Ct. 838, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops.

